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It is  commonly  supposed that there is  a single notion  of  in- 
dividual well-being that plays the following three roles.  First, it 
serves as an important basis for the decisions of  a single rational 
individual, at least for those decisions in which he or she alone is 
concerned  (that is to say, in which moral obligations and concerns 
for others can be left aside).  Second, it is what a concerned bene- 
factor, such as a friend or parent, has reason to promote.  Third, 
it is the basis on which an individual’s interests are taken into ac- 
count in moral argument.  This last claim is most plausible when 
the morality in question is utilitarian, since on a utilitarian account 
the moral point of  view is just  the point of  view of  a benefactor 
who is impartially concerned with everyone, and hence, if  the sec- 
ond claim  is  correct, with  the well-being  of  everyone.  But  it is 
commonly said that any moral  theory,  even a nonutilitarian one, 
must  rely  on  a notion  of individual  well-being  insofar  as it ac- 
knowledges  a  duty  of  benevolence  and insofar  as  it holds  that 
moral principles  are to be justified, at least in part, by  the impact 
they have on individuals’ lives. 
While well-being is supposed to play all three of  the roles I 
have just listed, the first of these roles is generally held to be pri- 
mary: well-being is important in the thinking of  a benefactor and 
in  moral  argument because of its importance  for the individual 
whose  well-being  it  is.  In particular, while  the notion  of  well- 
being is importa nt for morality, it is not itself a moral notion. It 
represents what an individual  has reason to want for himself  or 
I am indebted to  my commentators, Peter Hammond and Shelly Kagan, and 
also  to  many  members  of  the  audience  at  the  University  of  Michigan,  for  their 
stimulating and helpful comments.  Many others have also provided advice and criti- 
cism  that  has  led  to  substantial  changes.  In  particular,  I  am  grateful  to  Leonard 
Katz, Derek Parfit, Amartya Sen, Angela  Smith, and L. W. Sumner. 
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herself, leaving aside concern for others and any moral restraints 
or  obligations.  Well-being  is thus  an input into moral thinking 
that is not already shaped by moral assumptions. 
Well-being is also commonly supposed to be a notion that ad- 
mits of  quantitative comparisons of  at least some of  the following 
kinds: comparisons of the levels of  well-being enjoyed by  different 
individuals under various circumstances, comparisons of  the incre- 
ments  in  individuals’ well-being  that would result  from various 
changes, and perhaps also  comparisons of  the amounts of  well- 
being  represented by  different lives, considered  as a whole.  It is 
taken to be an important task  (important both for moral theory 
and for theories of  “rationality” or “prudence”)  to come up with 
a theory of well-being: a systematic account of  “what makes some- 
one’s life go better” that clarifies the boundary of this concept (the 
line between  those things that contribute to a person’s well-being 
and those that are desirable on other grounds)  and perhaps pro- 
vides a clearer basis for quantitative comparisons of the kinds just 
mentioned. 
I will argue in this lecture that many of  these suppositions are 
mistaken.  To put the point briefly: it is a mistake to think  that 
there is a single notion of  well-being that plays all of  the roles I 
have mentioned and that we need a theory of well-being to clarify 
this  concept.  We do have  a  rough  intuitive idea of  individual 
well-being, and we can make rough comparative judgments about 
what makes a life go better and worse from the point of  view of 
the person  who lives  it.  But  this concept of  well-being has sur- 
prisingly  little role to  play  in  the thinking of  the rational indi- 
vidual whose life is  in question.  It sounds absurd to say  that in- 
dividuals  have  no  reason  to be concerned  with  their  own  well- 
being, because this seems to imply that they have no reason to be 
concerned with those things that make their lives better.  Clearly 
they  do have  reason  to  be concerned  with  these  things.  But  in 
regard to their own lives they have little need to use the concept 
of  well-being  itself, either  in giving justifications  or in  drawing [SCALON]   The Status of Well-Being 95
distinctions.  In particular,  individuals have no need  for a theory 
that would clarify the boundaries of  their own well-being and pro- 
vide a basis for sharper quantitative comparisons. 
From a third-person point of  view, such as that of a benefactor, 
a notion of  well-being has greater significance.  In moral thinking, 
also, we may need to appeal to various conceptions of  well-being 
and to make comparisons of  how well-off people would be under 
various conditions, as  measured by  these conceptions.  But what 
are employed in moral argument are generally not notions of well- 
being  that individuals would use  to evaluate their own lives but, 
rather, various moral  conceptions  of  how well-off  a person is- 
that is  to say, conceptions that are shaped by  one or another idea 
of what we owe to and can claim from one another.  This is most 
obvious in political  philosophy in the various standards that have 
been proposed as measures of  distributive shares for purposes of 
assessing claims of justice, such as John Rawls’sprimary social 
goods  (income  and wealth, powers  and liberties, and the social 
bases  of  self-respect)  and Amartya  Sen’s capability sets  (which 
include the “functionings”such as good health, ability to take part 
in social life, and so on of which an individual is capable) .
1 From 
an  individual’s own  perspective,  these criteria  offer  very  incom- 
plete measures of  how well his or her life is going. One life might 
be much better than another from an individual’s point of view -
happier, more  successful and so on - even though the two lives 
were the same as measured by Rawls’sor Sen’s criteria. This di- 
vergence is due to the fact that these criteria are supposed to mea- 
sure only those aspects of  a life that, according to the theories in 
question, it is the responsibility of  basic social institutions to pro- 
vide for. I believe that the conceptions of well-being that figure in 
See John Rawls,  A  Theory of Justice,§5, and “Social Unity and Primary 
Goods,”  in Amartya  Sen  and  Bernard  Williams,  eds.,  Utilarianism  and  Beyond; 
Amartya  Sen, Inequality  Reexamined, chapter  3. It is clear  that Rawlsand Sen are 
not  intending to offer accounts  of  “what makes a life better from the point of  view 
of  the person who lives it.”  Rawls, in particular,  is quite clear about this.  (See, for 
example, “Social Unity and Primary Goods,” p. 169.) 96 The Tanner Lectures on Human  Values 
moral thinking more generally can be expected to diverge in simi- 
lar ways from the conceptions that individuals might use in assess- 
ing their own lives.  Whether they diverge or not, however, these 
conceptions of well-being will be moral conceptions, that is to say, 
they derive their significance and to a certain extent their distinc- 
tive  shape from their  role in the moral structures in which  they 
figure. 
My argument will proceed as follows.  In the next two sections 
I will identify the intuitive question of  well-being that I am dis- 
cussing  and identify  some of  the fixed points  that any plausible 
theory of  well-being in this sense would have to preserve.  I will 
then  argue that the concept of  one’s own well-being in the sense 
thus characterized  has little role to play in the thinking of  a ra- 
tional individual and that in thinking about his or her own life an 
individual has no need for a theory of well-being. After this I will 
return to the question of  the significance of well-being from third 
person and moral perspectives. 
2.QUESTIONS  OF WELL-BEING 
The notion  of  well-being  that I  am  concerned  with here is, 
although  somewhat  vague,  nonetheless  intuitively  familiar  and 
widely discussed.  It is, for example, the subject of James Griffin’s 
book  Well-Being and of  Derek Parfit’s well-known  discussion of 
“What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best?”  Both of  these discus- 
sions take up the question of  well-being partly because of  its sig- 
nificance for morality, but both treat it as a question that, first and 
foremost, can be asked by, and is important to, the person whose 
life it is.  Even when we focus on assessments of  a life from this 
perspective - the point of  view of  the person whose  life it is -
there are a number  of  different  questions that can be asked.  To 
identify the question of  well-being with which I am concerned it 
will be helpful to begin by  distinguishing it from four other ideas 
of  “the quality of  a life” with which it might be confused. 
2James Griffin, Well-Being; Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, appendix I. 
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On one natural interpretation, the quality of  life can mean the 
quality of  the conditions under which life is lived, including such 
things as freedom from illness and danger, access to nutrition, edu- 
cation,  and other opportunities and resources.  Quality of  life in 
this sense, which might be called “material welfare,” seems to be 
what we have in mind, for example, when we say that the quality 
of  life in Japan or Sweden is higher  than in Somalia.  Although 
there may be disagreements about how best to measure it, material 
welfare is a relatively clear notion, and it captures one important 
aspect of a life, from the point of view of  the person who lives it. 
But well-being,  from that point of view, includes more than this: 
one person can have a much better life than another - much hap- 
pier  and more successful, for example - even though their lives 
are lived under equally good, or bad, material conditions. 
The phrase “from the point of view of the person who lives it” 
calls  to  mind  a  second  aspect of  a  life, namely  its experiential 
quality or “what it would be like to live it.”  Like material wel- 
fare, experiential quality  is  a relatively clear notion,  and an im- 
portant one. We  all care about the experiential quality of our lives 
and have reason to do so.  It has sometimes been claimed that the 
quality of  a life in the sense I am concerned with - the level of 
well-being it represents - is completely determined by  its experi- 
ential quality.3 But this is a substantive claim, which can sensibly 
be denied.  It makes sense to say that the life of  a person who is 
contented  and happy  only because  he  is  systematically deceived 
about what his life is really like is for that reason a worse life, for 
him,  than  a  life would  be  that was  similarly happy where this 
happiness was based on true beliefs. To take the standard example, 
it makes sense to say that the life of  a person who is happy only 
because he does not  know that the people whom he regards  as 
devoted friends are in fact artful deceivers is worse, for the person 
who lives it, than a similar life in which the person is made happy 
This is implied, for example, by Henry Sidgwick’sclaim that desirable con- 
sciousness is the only ultimate good. See Methods  of  Ethics,  book 3,  chapter 14.
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by  true friends.  I myself  believe that this claim not only makes 
sense but is in fact true,  Even if  I am mistaken, however, and ex-
perential quality is the complete and correct answer to the question 
of  well-being, it remains true that this is a substantive claim, not 
true by definition. So the question of well-being and the question 
of experiential quality are not the same question. 
A third interpretation of the quality of a life is what I will call 
its worthiness or value, as constituted, for example, by  the contri- 
bution it makes to other goods and the degree to which it is par- 
ticularly  admirable and worthy of  respect.  Value in this sense is, 
again, clearly distinct from well-being.  The life of  a person who 
sacrifices his own well-being for the sake of  others may be, for that 
reason, a particularly valuable one, and in order for this to be true 
there must be a sacrifice involved. 
The question of  whether a person should prefer such a life of 
sacrifice over  the available alternatives would  be  an example of 
what I will call the question of  choiceworthiness. Each of the first 
three notions  I  have  considered - material  welfare, experiential 
quality, and worthiness or value - is a factor that may bear on the 
choiceworthiness of  a life.  So also is well-being in the sense I am 
discussing.  We might  say, for example,  that there is reason  to 
choose a certain life because of  its great value, even though it in- 
volves a low level of  well-being, or that the value of  a life did not 
in  fact  make it worth  choosing  given  the sacrifice in well-being 
that it would involve.
4 So choiceworthiness is  a different notion 
from any of  the other four taken alone. 
4 It might seem that when we say this we are identifying well-being with experi- 
ential  quality  and  that when  these  two  are carefully distinguished  the  question  of 
well-being turns out to be the same as the question of  choiceworthiness. But this is 
not so.  Aperson who abandons a valued  ambition  in order to help his family may 
have made a net sacrifice in the quality of  his life, by giving up the accomplishments 
he would have made,  even  if  the experiential  quality  of  the life he chooses  is  no 
lower  than  that of  the one he foregoes.  It may,  for example, involve more joy  and 
less struggle, stress, and frustration.  The life he lives can therefore be more choice-
worthy  and involve no loss in experiential quality while still being a worse life for 
him, in the sense with which I am here concerned. 
The Tanner Lectures on Human Values99
The intuitive notion  of  well-being that I am concerned with, 
then, is an idea of  the quality of  a life for the person who lives it 
that is broader than material welfare, at least potentially broader 
than experiential quality, different from worthiness or value, and 
narrower  than  choiceworthiness, all  things  considered.  Having 
roughly identified  the question of  well-being and distinguished it 
from some others, I want now to consider how this question might 
be answered. 
3.  ACCOUNTS OF WELL-BEING 
Answers  to  the  question,  “What makes  someone’s  life  go 
better ?” are commonly divided into three types: experiential theo- 
ries,  desire theories,  and  “objective list” or, as I will call  them, 
“substantive good” theories.5 Experiential theories hold that the 
quality of  a life “for the person who lives it” is completely deter- 
mined by  what I called above its experiential quality.  Desire theo- 
ries hold that the quality of  a person’s life is a matter of  the extent 
to which that person’s desires are satisfied.  The hallmark of  such 
views, as I will understand them, is that there is no standard apart 
from a person’s desires for assessing the quality of  his or her life. 
Substantive good theories  are just  those that deny this claim and 
hold that there are standards for assessing the quality of a life that 
are not entirely dependent on the desires of  the person whose life 
it is.  On this way of  looking at things, experiential theories count 
as one kind  of substantive good theory,  since they deny that the 
satisfaction of  desires for things other than states of consciousness 
can make a life better.
6
5 This tripartite division follows the one Parfit gives in appendix 1 of Reasons 
and Persons.  The term  “substantive good theory”  is  taken from my “Value, Desire 
and Quality of Life” in M. Nussbaum and A.Sen, eds., The Quality of  Life.  The 
discussion  of  well-being  in this section  and  the following one draws on that article 
but goes beyond it in a number of  respects. 
6 This  is true even of what Parfit calls “preference hedonism,” according to 
which  the quality  of  a person’s  life  is  measured  by  the degree to which  it contains 
experiences  of  the kind  that  that person prefers  to have  (see Reasons and  Persons, 
pp. 493-94).
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Experiential theories provide a clear boundary for the concept 
of  well-being: something contributes to well-being if, but only if, 
it affects the quality of  one’s experience.  This clarity can be seen 
as  a  theoretical  advantage;  the problem, however,  is  that these 
boundaries are implausibly narrow.  The difference between  true 
and  false friends, which  I  have already mentioned, is only  one 
obvious example of  the ways in which the quality of a life, for the 
person who lives it, depends on factors that go beyond how the life 
seems to that person. 
Desire theories can accommodate these factors, since they hold 
that a person’s life can be made better or worse not only by changes 
in  the experience  of  living that  life but  also by  changes  in  the 
world  that affect the  degree to which the world is  the way  that 
person desires it to be.  But these theories are also open to serious 
objection.  The most general view of this kind - it might be called 
the unrestricted actual desire theory - holds that a person’s well- 
being is measured by the degree to which all of  the person’s actual 
desires are satisfied.  Since one can have a desire about almost any- 
thing,  this  makes  an  implausibly  broad  range of  considerations 
count  as determinants of  a person’s well-being.  Someone might 
have a desire about the chemical composition of  some star, about 
whether  blue  was  Napoleon’s favorite  color,  or  about  whether 
Julius Caesar was an honest man.  But it would be odd to suggest 
that the well-being of  a person who has such desires is affected by 
these facts themselves (as opposed to the pleasure he or she derives 
from having certain beliefs about them).  The fact that some dis- 
tant star is made up of the elements I would like it to be made of 
does not seem to make my  life better  (assuming that I am not an 
astronomer  whose  life work  has  been  devoted  to a  theory  that 
would be confirmed or refuted by this fact). 
Asecond problem for desire theories concerns the relation be- 
tween desires and reasons.  Presumably one thing that makes desire 
theories of  well-being plausible is the idea that if  a person has a 
desire for something then  (other things equal)  he or she has rea-101
son to do what will promote that thing.  I believe, however, that 
the fact that a person has a certain desire is hardly ever what pro- 
vides him or her with a reason for action.  What an agent sees as 
providing reasons for action are generally not his or her desires but 
the considerations that, in the agent’s view, make the objects of 
these desires desirable.7 If this is correct it poses a problem for 
desire-based accounts of  well-being, since it would be odd to claim 
that the factors that make something contribute to one’s well-being 
do not provide reasons for pursuing it. 
A third  problem  that has been  raised  for desire views arises 
from the fact that people’s desires change, and what they desire at 
one time may conflict with what they desire at another.8 When 
this happens, which desire determines what contributes to the per- 
son’s well-being?  One natural response is that it is the later desire 
that counts, since the satisfaction of  a desire contributes to well- 
being only if  the person has the desire at the time that it is satis- 
fied.  It would be easy  to see why this should be so if  what con- 
tributed to well-being were just the pleasant experience of  know- 
ing that one’s desire is satisfied, but the grounds for making pres- 
ent desires  authoritative is  less clear if, as a desire theory holds, 
what  matters  is  not  pleasant  experience  but  rather  the  desire’s 
being satisfied, that is to say, the world’s being the way the person 
desires it to be. 
These objections  can  be  partially  met  by shifting to what is 
commonly called an “informed desire” theory.  On this view, the 
quality of  a life for the person who lives it is determined by the 
degree to which that person’s informeddesires are satisfied, where 
informed desires are ones that are based on a full understanding 
of the nature of  their objects and do not depend on any errors of 
7 I defend this claim in chapter 1 of my forthcoming book, What We Owe  to 
Each  Other.  Similar  claims  have  been  made  by  others  as  well.  See,  for example, 
Stephen Darwall, ImpartialReason, pp. 35-42.
8 A  difficulty emphasized by Richard Brandt. See A  Theory of  the Good and 
the Right, chapter 13. 
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reasoning.9 This constraint narrows the range of  factors that con- 
tribute to a person’s well-being. (Presumably not many of us would 
have informed desires about what Napoleon’s favorite color was.) 
It also supplies a link between what contributes to our well-being 
and what we have reason to promote, since a person who has an 
informed desire for something is likely to have a reason for want- 
ing to bring that thing about. 
But neither of these responses fully meets the objection in ques- 
tion. The restriction to informed desires may eliminate some whim- 
sical or foolish notions, but it will still include many desires whose 
objects lie well beyond the quality of  the desirer’s own life, intui- 
tively understood.  Suppose, for example, that I very much admire 
a certain person and therefore desire that her struggle and sacrifice 
will be crowned with success and happiness. This may be an in- 
formed desire; it might even be strengthened by  fuller knowledge 
of  the person’s life and character.  Even if  this is so, if  I have no 
connection with her beyond my  admiration and this informed de- 
sire, then the quality of my life is not affected one way or the other 
by her fate.” 
The shift  to  informed  desires  also  represents  an  important 
change in the role of  desires as determinants of  well-being.  If  a 
full appreciation of the ways in which my  life would be changed 
if  I could speak French well would lead me to have a strong desire 
to master that language, then it is likely both that I have reason to 
do this and that doing it would contribute to my well-being.  But 
what role does the desire that I would have play in making these 
things true?  What makes it the case that I have reason to learn 
See John  Harsanyi, “Morality and  the Theory of  Rational  Behavior,”  in  Sen 
and Williams, eds., Utilitarianism  and Beyond, pp.47,  55-56; James  Griffin,  Well-
Being,p.14.  Griffin  offers  a  lengthy  and  well-articulated  defense of  an  informed 
desire view.  In his formulation, informed  desires  are ones  that  are  “formed  by  an 
appreciation of the nature of [their] objects.” There are many questions about how 
the  idea  of  “informed desires”  is  to be  understood.  I  will  discuss  a  few of  these 
below. 
10
9
An example modeled on Parfit’s case of “the stranger on the train.” See Rea- 
sons and Persons, p. 494. 103
French  is  the  enjoyment  and other  benefits I would  gain from 
being  able to speak it, not the desire that full awareness of  these 
benefits would generate.  Informed desires may correspond to rea- 
sons, and the things that fulfill them may contribute to our well- 
being, insofar as these desires are responses to considerations that 
make their objects desirable.  But an account of  well-being based 
on these facts is quite different from one based on the idea that 
what advances a person’s well-being is the fulfillment of his or her 
desires. 
Despite these objections, the idea that desire satisfaction is the 
basis of  well-being has had wide appeal.  Why should this be so ?
One natural  explanation is that the term  “desire” can be under- 
stood to refer to a number of  different things, and those who have 
off ered desire-based  accounts of  well-being may have been under- 
standing “desire” in such a way that these objections do not arise, 
or are less troubling.  It will be instructive to consider two of  these 
possible interpretations. 
On one  interpretation,  “desires”  are understood  as  “prefer- 
ences”  in  the sense that figures  in  formal theories of  individual 
and  social choice.  A central  claim of  these  theories  is  that the 
preferences of  a rational individual can be represented by  a utility 
function u (x), such that for any states x and y, u (x) >u(y)if 
and only if the individual prefers x  to y. It might seem that aper- 
son’s level of utility, as defined by  such a function, should be taken 
as a measure of  well-being in the sense we are now concerned with 
and that this would amount to a desire-based theory of well-being. 
So it is worth asking whether  such theories are subject to the ob- 
jections I have just considered. 
The short answer  is that these objections do apply insofar as 
the theories  in  question  are taken  to be,  or  involve,  theories of 
well-being, but that this is not how those theories are most plau- 
sibly  understood.  Formal  theories  of  individual  choice,  such  as 
those  specified by  the Savage or the von  Neumann-Morgenstern 
axioms, are, as  that name implies, most plausibly  understood  as 
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accounts of  what it is most rational for an individual  to choose. 
In  theories  of  this  kind, preferences are taken  as expressing an 
individual’s conclusions  about  the relative desirability  of  various 
outcomes  or  policies,  and claims  are then  made  about what an 
individual  has most  reason  to do, given  these preferences.  This 
involves no claim that preferences are the most fundamental start- 
ing points for individual deliberation, so it is no objection to such a 
theory to point out that from an individual’s own point of view his 
or her preferences are not basic sources of  reasons.  My preference 
for A over Bmay be a reason  for having certain preferences re- 
garding probability mixtures of A, B,and other outcomes, but that 
preference is not what makes A more desirable than B from my 
point of  view; what does that is, presumably, certain features of 
A and B.The failure of preferences to be basic sources of reasons 
is  thus no embarrassment  to formal theories of  rational  choice. 
Nor is the wide range of possible objects of preferences a problem 
for such theories.  They are offered not as accounts of  well-being 
(of  “what makes a person’s life go better”) but rather of  what a 
person has reason todo or choose all things considered, and the 
grounds on which these choices are to be based are explicitly in- 
tended  to  include preferences for things other than the person’s 
own well-being.11 
Turning now to formal theories of  socialchoice, these theories 
are themselves subject to various interpretations.12 On one com- 
11 Confusion on this point can arise from giving the idea that a person has rea- 
son to do what will maximize her  utility  an “egoistic” reading, according to which 
“her utility,”  like “her happiness,”  is  taken to denote some benefit  to her.  But it is 
generally agreed that this egoistic reading is mistaken. 
12The premises of Arrow’s famous Possibility Theorem, for example, can be 
understood  either  as stating conditions about how acceptable ways  of  making social 
choices must be based  on the preferences of  the members of  society or as stating con- 
ditions about how the notion of  what is  “good from the point of  view of  society” is 
related to what is good from the points of  view of  the individuals who make up that 
society.  Amartya Sen points out the importance of  distinguishing between these two 
interpretations  in  “Social  Choice  Theory:  A  Re-Examination,’’  reprinted  in  his 
Choice,  Welfare  and  Measurement,  pp.  158-200.  John  Broomealso discusses  this 
ambiguity in chapter 7of  Weighing Goods. 105
mon interpretation, however, they concern the way in which social 
choices should be based on individual preferences.  So understood, 
they begin with a set (the “domain”) of  alternatives among which 
“society” is to choose.  The basic assumption of such theories is the 
plausible ethical one that since these are the decisions of a society 
they  should be based on the preferences  of  the members of  that 
society, and the question that these theories address is how, more 
exactly, they should be so “based.”  It is central to the ethical idea 
behind  such theories  that for purposes of  social decision-making 
individual preferences should be treated as sovereign  (and that it 
would be “paternalistic” to second guess them).  This is quite com- 
patible  with  the fact  that,  from the points  of  view of  the indi- 
viduals  themselves,  these  same  preferences  are  not  the  starting 
points of practical deliberation but depend on other considerations, 
in the way pointed out above. 
Nor is the broad range of  possible objects of  these preferences 
(the fact that they may be preferences for things that lie beyond 
the bounds of the individuals’ own lives) a problem for theories of 
social choice as I am now interpreting them.  The domain includes 
all of  those things that society has to decide about, and this will 
naturally include things outside of  the life of  any single member. 
There  may,  of  course,  be  controversy  about  which  alternatives 
should be included in the domain of  social choices over which all 
the members of  the society should have a say (should this domain 
include what members of the society do in private, for example?13)
And there are also questions about which preferences are entitled 
to  be  taken  into  account  (should  preferences  based  simply  on 
hatred for other groups be counted?14 These are moral questions, 
and the answers to them reflect judgments about justice and politi-
13 The problem raised by this question has been explored at length in the litera- 
ture spawned  by  Amartya  Sen’s “The Impossibility of  a  Paretian  Liberal,”  Journal 
of  Political Economy 78(1970).
14 Harsanyi,for one, would exclude such “anti-social preferences.” See  p. 56 of 
“Morality  and  the Theory  of  Rational Behavior,”  in Sen  and Williams, eds.,  Utili-
tarianism and Beyond, pp. 39-62. 
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cal rights, not simply about the scope of  individual well-being.  It 
follows that the individual  utility  functions  that figure in  social 
choice  theory,  even  though  they  are based  on individual  prefer- 
ences, are shaped by  the larger moral and political theory of which 
they are a part. They do not reflect merely a conception of what 
would make the individuals’ lives go better or even simply of what 
is  good from the point of  view of  these individuals.  Insofar as 
these functions express anything that could be called a conception 
of  well-being at all, it is what I called above a moral conception, 
rather than a personal one. 
Formal theories  of  social choice can, of  course, be understood 
in a different way: as accounts of how what is good from the point 
of  view of  society must be related to what is good from the point 
of  view of  the individuals who make it up.  Standard terminology 
can pull one toward this interpretation.  Kenneth Arrow, for ex- 
ample, after presenting the problem of  social choice in much the 
way  I have  above, goes on to call a function  that determines a 
single social ordering of  the domain given any collection of  indi- 
vidual orderings a “social welfare function.” 
15 This sounds like a 
measure of  how “well-off” the society is and thus invites one to 
regard individual utility functions in turn as measures of individual 
well-being,  the idea being  that the welfare of  a society must be 
made  up of  the welfare  (i.e., well-being)  of  its members.  But 
once individual utility is regarded in this way, the theory is open to 
objections  of  the kind  raised  above  to  desire-based  accounts  of 
well-being - for example, to doubts as to whether a person’s well- 
being is increased by  the satisfaction of  any preference, regardless 
of what its object may be. 
I conclude, therefore, that the preference-based  conceptions of 
utility  that  are used  in  formal  theories of  individual  and social 
choice avoid the objections to desire-based accounts of  well-being 
that I mentioned above just insofar as they do not involve concep-
15 See Social Choice and Individual  Values, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1966),  esp. pp.17-19, 106.107
tions of  well-being in  the relevant sense.  Insofar as desire-based 
theories  of  well-being  are  modeled  on  the preference-based  ac- 
counts of  individual utility that flourish in social choice theory, or 
are taken to derive support from such theories, this involves mix- 
ing up two quite  different  things: personal  conceptions  of  well- 
being and explicitly moral ones. 
Let  me turn, then, to another possible  source of  support for 
desire-based accounts of  well-being.  One of  the things that can be 
meant by  saying that a person has a desire for something in the 
broad  sense in which that term is often used is that achieving or 
getting that thing is one of that person’s aims.  Moreover, it is also 
true that success in one’s aims, at least insofar as these are rational, 
is one of  the things that contributes to the quality of a life, viewed 
from  a purely  personal  perspective.
16 It seems likely,  therefore, 
that some of the appeal of  informed desire accounts of well-being 
comes from the undoubted appeal of  this related idea. I will argue 
that at least the following is true: the idea that success in one’s 
rational  aims  contributes  to  one’s well-being  can  account  for a 
number  of  the intuitions  that have seemed  to support informed 
desire theories while avoiding most of  these theories’ implausible 
implications. 
Both  the idea of  informed desires and the related idea of  ra- 
tional aims are open to broader and narrower interpretations.  On 
the one hand, they  can  be  understood to include  those  aims  or 
desires  that a person  would  have  good reason  to have.  On the 
other hand, by  a person’s rational aims we might mean aims that 
he or she actually has, insofar as these are rational (that is to say, 
insofar as the nature of these aims does not provide good reason to 
revise or abandon them).  I will refer to these as, respectively, the 
broad interpretation of rational aims and the narrow interpretation. 
My  focus in what follows will  be  on the narrow interpretation. 
16 Joseph Raz emphasizes the importance of success in one’s main aims as an 
element of well-being.  See chapter  12 of  his The Morality of  Freedom.  I am much 
indebted to Raz’s discussion. 
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I mentioned above, as a problem for an informed desire theory 
of  well-being, that on such a view the value of  desire satisfaction 
seems in the end to play no real role in explaining why some things 
contribute to a person’s well-being.  It may be true that something 
contributes to one’s well-being only if  one has reason to desire it. 
But even when this is so, what makes this thing good will not be 
the fact that it would satisfy  that hypothetical  desire but  rather 
those considerations, whatever they may be, that provide reasons 
for desiring  it.  The fact  of  desire itself  seems to play  no role. 
By  contrast, the narrow interpretation of  the idea of  a rational 
aim preserves a real role for the analog of  desire-  that is to say, 
for the fact that a person  actually has a certain aim - while also 
preserving  the  “critical” element that motivates  the shift to  in- 
formed desires.  The requirement that an aim be rational incorpo- 
rates this  critical element by  allowing for the possibility of  sub- 
stantive criticism of aims. This requirement also accommodates the 
fact that from an individual’s own point of  view what makes an 
aim worth adopting and pursuing is, first and foremost, not merely 
its being chosen or desired but the considerations that (in his or 
her view)  make  it worthwhile  or valuable.  (Given this fact, an 
aim that is open to rational criticism is defective from the point of 
view of  the person who has it, not merely from that of  a critical 
third party.)  But  one cannot  respond  to  every value or pursue 
every end that is worthwhile, and a central part of  life for a ra- 
tional creature lies in selecting those things that it will pursue.  It 
thus makes a difference whether an aim has been adopted, and this 
is the rationale behind the narrow interpretation of “rational aim”: 
if  something is one of  a person’s aims, then  (provided it is  ra- 
tional)  success  in  achieving  it  becomes  one of  the  things  that 
makes that person’s life better. 
The term  “aim” invites an interpretation  that is both volun- 
taristic  and teleological: an aim is  something one “adopts,” and 
having an  aim is a matter of  intending to bring about a certain 
result.  For present purposes, however,  “aim” needs to be under-109
stood in a way that is broader than its normal meaning in both of 
these respects.  If  I have the aim of  being a good son, then succeed- 
ing in this contributes to my well-being even though there was no 
moment at which I “adopted” this aim or consciously formed this 
intention.  Moreover, the forms of  success that contribute to well- 
being include living up to one’s values, and as I argued above this 
is generally not simply a matter of achieving certain results.  If, for 
example, I am committed to being an upright and honorable per- 
son, living up to this ideal is not merely a matter of promoting cer- 
tain results, but rather of  responding properly to the various rea- 
sons that these ideals involve. 
The idea  that well-being depends, at least in part, on success 
in one’s rational aims yields an account of  well-being that has the 
“flexibility” that has been held to be an advantage of  informed 
desire views.  James Griffin, for example, finds objective accounts 
of  well-being  unsatisfactory  because  they  seem  to  prescribe  the 
same list of  goods for everyone, and he argues that an informed 
desire account is to be preferred for this reason.1 7AsGriffin recog- 
nizes, any plausible substantive good theory will allow for the fact 
that different people have different needs.  In addition, any theory 
that recognizes pleasure as a good will have a further degree of 
“flexibility,”  since  different  activities  and experiences will  bring 
pleasure  to different people.  But Griffin rightly holds that more 
variability is required, and the idea of success in one’s rational aims 
seems to provide it, without invoking the troublesome notion of 
desire.  Since different people can have different rational aims, an 
account that makes success in one’s rational aims one determinant 
of  well-being will allow for a further degree of  variability with- 
out  incorporating  the  full-blown  subjectivity that  makes  desire 
theories implausible. 
The shift from “informed desires” to “rational aims” also pro- 
vides a basis for plausible responses to several other objections that 
plague  desire  theories.  The first  of  these  is  the problem, men-
17 See  Well-Being,  pp. 54-55. 
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tioned above, that a person’s desires at one time may conflict with 
what he or  she desires at another.  When desires conflict in this 
way,  how  are  we  to determine  what makes  a  life better?  The 
rational  aim  account  provides  the grounds  for  a  systematic an- 
swer.18 If an aim has been an important one for a person for a 
significant period of  his or her life, then succeeding in it generally 
makes that life better even if  the aim is one that the person is no 
longer pursuing (or has given up on, perhaps through losing hope 
of ever succeeding). Apossible exception is the case of aims that 
the person has abandoned on the ground that they are not, after 
all, worth pursuing.  If  this judgment is correct, then the aim was 
not a rational one, so succeeding in it would not, in any event, have 
contributed to the person’s well-being.  But what if  the aim was a 
valuable one and the person was mistaken in abandoning it? I am 
inclined to say in that case that if  this aim turns out, after the per- 
son has long since given it up, to be at least in part a success  (if, 
for example, the political movement he started, and devoted many 
years  to promoting, turns out to be  of  great social benefit)  then 
this does make the person’s life better. 
This leaves the question of  what to say in cases where there is 
a conflict between  a present aim and another aim that the person 
held in the past but has since abandoned.  Suppose, for example, 
that a person who started a political movement and devoted years 
of  his life to it has now joined an opposing group.  Which would 
do more to make the person’s life better, the success of his former 
group, or that of  the one he now works for? The answer depends, 
I believe, on a number of  factors. The first is his reason for shift- 
ing from one to the other and, more generally, on whether these 
aims are, or were, rational ones.  If only one is worthwhile, then it 
is success in that aim that contributes to his well-being.  If both are 
rational, then  the success of  either could  contribute.  To decide 
which  would  contribute  more we would  need  to consider  such 
18 I am grateful to Shelly Kagan for helpful criticism that led me to reconsider 
my views on this point, but I do not know that he would agree with the conclusions 
I have reached. 111 
things  as  the  amount of  time  and effort he devoted to the two 
projects  and the relative  magnitude of  his  contribution  to their 
success.
19
Another problem for desire-based accounts of  well-being arose 
from the fact that the range of  a person’s possible desires - even 
of  informed desires - is wider than his or her well-being, intui- 
tively understood. This ceases to be a problem when we shift from 
informed  desires  to  rational  aims.  I  mentioned  above  that  the 
satisfaction of  a person’s desire that a distant star should have a 
certain chemical  composition  would not, normally,  contribute to 
that person’s well-being, but that things might be different if  the 
person were an astronomer who had devoted his or her life to the 
development  of  a theory  that would be  confirmed or refuted by 
this evidence.  The need  for this qualification  illustrates the fact 
that, while one can have an informed desire for something that is 
quite unrelated  to how  one’s own  life goes, a person’s  rational 
aims are, intuitively, an important part of  his or her life.  So the 
fulfillment of  these aims is  more plausibly  held to contribute to 
well-being.20
19 The fact that one of these projects is in the past is not a crucial factor. A
person could have conflicting aims at the very same time, and it is also possible that 
fulfilling one of  a person’s present aims  (while he still has  it) is incompatible with 
fulfilling, at some later  time, a different aim that he will have then.  In these  cases 
also  the  answer  to  the  question  of  what  will  make  the person’s  life  better  pre- 
sumably depends  on whether these  aims  are rational,  on his contributions  to them, 
and  on how it would be rational  for him to modify  these aims, given  the conflicts. 
20  It is plausible to hold that nothing can contribute to a person’s well-being 
unless it affects his or her life. In “The Limits of Well-Being’’ (Social Philosophy 
and Policy 9 [1992]:169-89) Shelly Kagan describes a notion of  well-being that is 
narrower  than  the  one  I  am  describing  here  because  it is  circumscribed  by  the 
stronger  requirement  that  nothing can  contribute  to a person’s  well-being  unless  it 
benefits  him  or  her  intrinsically,  where  this  seems  to  mean  bringing  about  some 
change in the person’s physical or psychological state.  He  observes in a footnote that 
it may be a consequence  of  his view that “it might be one thing for a person to be 
well-off and quite another for that person’s life to go well” (footnote 7,p. 182). 
He acknowledges that there may be some question about how important this circum- 
scribed  notion of  well-being is, compared with other goods (see p. 188 and footnote 
10).I would agree, and I suspect that philosophers such as Parfit and Griffin have 
generally  discussed  the wider  notion  because  it has  greater claim  to importance. I 
will argue below that the importance of  even this wider notion seems to me to have 
been exaggerated. 
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Athird problem for desire theories concerns the way in which 
the fulfillment of  various desires (or success in various aims) con- 
tributes  to well-being.  One idea would be that a person’s overall 
well-being is measured by the sum of his or her informed desires 
that are fulfilled.  But it does not seem that a person’s well-being is 
in  fact always  increased  by  increasing  the  number  of  informed 
desires or rational aims that he or she fulfills.  If  this were so then 
everyone would be advised to adopt as many informed desires or 
rational aims as possible as long as these can be satisfied, which is 
clearly absurd. This difficulty led Derek Parfit to suggest that what 
he called “summative” desire theories are less plausible than “glo- 
bal” versions, which hold that what counts in determining a per- 
son’s well-being is the satisfaction of his or her  (informed)  “glo- 
bal desires,” that is to say, informed desires about “some part of 
one’s life considered as a whole, or   . . . about one’s whole life.” 
There is certainly something right in this suggestion, and shift- 
ing from the terminology of  desires to that of rational aims opens 
up the possibility for a more convincing way of  putting it.  The 
objection Parfit is responding to involves at least twoproblems. 
The first is  that  “summative” desire theories,  by  suggesting that 
being in a state of  having one’s desire satisfied is what contributes 
to well-being, seem to invite the absurd conclusion that one should 
adopt new  desires with  the  aim of  increasing the occurrence of 
such states. When we shift to rational aims, however, the absurdity 
of  this conclusion points directly to a natural way of  avoiding it. 
The fulfillment of  an aim contributes to one’s well-being only if 
that aim is one that it is rational to have.  But the fact that adopt- 
ing a certain aim, which could easily be satisfied, would be a way 
of  producing a state of  “having fulfilled an aim” is not, in general, 
a good reason for adopting that aim.”  So if that is one’s only rea- 
21 Reasons and Persons, p. 497.  Parfit himself was not advocating any form of 
desire theory. 
22 The qualifier “in general” is necessary because there may be special cases in 
which  having  fulfilled  an aim might be a goal worth seeking.  This might  be  true, 
for example, in  the  case  of  a  person  who was  severely  depressed, whose  condition 
would be improved by any success, however trivial. 113
son for having  an aim, fulfilling it does not contribute to one’s 
well-being. 
This avoids the absurd conclusion on which  the original  ob- 
jection turned, but it does not avoid a second objection, which ap- 
plies  to  “summative” accounts  whether  they  identify  well-being 
with  the  sum  of  satisfied informed  desires or  with  the sum  of 
rational aims that are fulfilled.  During the course of  a life, a per- 
son adopts many aims that are rational in the sense at issue here 
(one does not  have good reason  to  reject  or  revise them), but 
which  do not seem to contribute to one’s well-being in a serious 
sense.  On a vacation at the seashore, for example, I may adopt the 
aim of showing my child a certain unusual bird or the aim of  get- 
ting exercise by swimming every day.  Even though these aims are 
rational,  it would  be implausible to say  that succeeding in each 
of  them increases my  well-being,  and it is even more implausible 
to say  that my  well-being as a whole is measured by  the sum of 
such successes over  the course of  my  life.  Parfit’s invocation  of 
“global desires” offers an appealing response to this problem.  The 
quality  of  a life, he  suggests, is  not measured  by  the extent  to 
which  small everyday desires corresponding to the kinds of  aims 
I have just listed are fulfilled.  What counts is rather a matter of 
the fulfillment of larger-scale desires about how one’s whole life or 
some significant part of it should go. 
This  move  has  a  natural  explanation  when  we  shift  from 
“desires”  to  “aims”  and  hence  from  “global  desires”  to  what 
Joseph  Raz  calls  “comprehensive  goals” - larger-scale  plans  or 
intentions about how one’s life, or some part of it, should go.  As
Raz  has  emphasized,  our  goals  have  a  “hierarchical”  characer. 
Comprehensive goals, such as the goal of  succeeding in a certain 
profession, or being a good parent, are of necessity quite abstract. 
23 See The Morality of Freedom, p. 293. Rawlsmakes a similar point about the  
hierarchical nature of goals in  A Theory of Justice, pp. 408-11. As pointed out 
above,  I  am  using  the  term  “aim”  in  a broad  sense to  include a person’s values  as 
well  as  specific objectives  that he or  she is  attempting  to  bring  about.  When, fol- 
lowing Raz, I  use the term  “goals” rather than  “aims,” I intend it to be understood 
in the same broad sense. 
[SCALON]   The Status of Well-Being
23114 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
They need  to be filled  in by  specifying successively more specific 
plans  and goals.  For  example, someone who wants  to be  a suc- 
cessful physicist has reason to get the necessary kinds of  training. 
This involves attending the right schools and universities,  taking 
the right courses, reading certain books and articles, going to class 
and to the laboratory, and even more specific goals and actions, 
such as finding the right instruments for an experiment. 
The idea  of  “comprehensiveness”  that is  intended here is  a 
comparative  notion.  I  am  not  suggesting  that  everyone  has  or 
should have a single comprehensive goal or “plan of  life.”  Per- 
haps few people have such goals.  But most people do have (rela- 
tively)  comprehensive  goals  of  a  more modest  sort, defined  by 
careers, friendships, marriages and family relations, and political 
and religious commitments.  What is being claimed  is that many 
of  the specific goals that we set out to achieve in action are goals 
that we have reason  to pursue because of  their  relation to more 
abstract  goals of  this kind, and when  these more specific actions 
contribute to the quality of  our lives it is mainly in virtue of this 
relation to these more comprehensive goals.  This brings out what 
is  wrong with  a  “summative”  view.  Succeeding in most  of  our 
goals contributes  to  our well-being not by  being  a little unit of 
“success” but rather by contributing to the larger goals that give us 
reason to pursue them. 
More comprehensive goals have two kinds of  “priority.”  First, 
they have priority over  the more specific goals that they give us 
reason to pursue because they provide the reasons that make those 
subsidiary  goals  rational.  Second, they  have,  and confer on the 
subsidiary goals they support, priority over unrelated goals such as 
those in my vacation  example.  That is to say, we have reason to 
attach more importance to goals of  the former sort than to these 
“free-standing” ones, and to revise or abandon goals of  this latter 
sort in cases of conflict. If  we suppose, as seems plausible, that the 
degree to which  success in a goal contributes to one’s well-being 
depends on the degree of importance one has reason to attach to it 115
in deciding what to do, then this explains why goals like those in 
my  vacation  example should seem only trivially  related  to well- 
being.  If  it is asked what gives comprehensive goals this impor- 
tance, the answer  is  that to hold  something as a comprehensive 
goal just is to hold it as a goal that has priority of  the two kinds 
described above.
24 So this priority is justified by  the reasons that 
support adopting something as a comprehensive goal in the first 
place and that continue to give one reason not to reconsider that 
decision.
25
I conclude that the idea that well-being is advanced by  success 
in one’s rational aims can explain the intuitions that seem to sup- 
port  informed  desire accounts of  well-being  and can  do so in a 
much  more  convincing way than informed desire accounts them- 
selves.  This makes it plausible to suppose that much of  the appeal 
of informed desire accounts of well-being derives from a failure to 
distinguish between informed desires and rational aims.  Whether 
this is so or not, any plausible  account of  what makes a life go 
better from the point of  view of  the person who lives it must rec- 
ognize  success  in one’s rational aims as one component of  well- 
being. 
Success in one’s rational aims is not, however, a complete ac- 
count of  well-being. Pleasure and other forms of what Henry Sidg-
wick called “desirable consciousness” can contribute to one’s well- 
being whether  or not one has “aimed” at them.  In addition, the 
idea of  success in one’s rational aims does not even capture all of 
the nonexperiential  factors that make a life better  even if  most, 
or perhaps even all, of  these factors depend on one’s aims. 
24 Here I rely on the fact that adopting an aim or goal is not just a matter of 
coming to assign  a positive value to certain results.  When we adopt an aim or goal 
we give it one  or  another  particular  role  in our practical  thinking:  the role of  a 
temporary diversion, or of  a career, or of  a specific goal within a career, for example. 
Different kinds  of  reasons  are required  to  justify adopting goals for these different 
roles. 
25 A  desire theory could presumably explain the analog of the first kind of 
priority  I  have  mentioned - priority  of  global  desires  over desires that are derived 
from them.  Whether it could explain priority of  the second kind is less clear. 
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To see this, consider again the example of friendship. A  per- 
son  cannot  get  the  intrinsic  benefits of  friendship  without  hav- 
ing friendship as one of  his or her own aims in the broad sense of 
“aim” that I have been using. A  misanthrope, who cares nothing 
for friends but to whom others are nonetheless devoted, may get 
some of  the instrumental benefits of  friendship, such as the help 
that friends provide, but not those benefits that involve standing in 
a certain special relation to others, since he does not stand in that 
relation to anyone.  It is debatable whether the life of  such a per- 
son would be better if these people genuinely care about him than 
it  would  be if  they treated  him in exactly the same way  out of 
other  motives.  Even  if  this  does make  a  difference, however,  it 
does not make as important a difference as it would in the case of a 
person  who himself  cared  about  friendship  and  regarded  these 
people as friends.  But even though the greater difference that the 
genuineness  of  friends makes in  the  latter  case  depends on  the 
person’s having a certain aim, this contribution to well-being is not 
plausibly  accounted  for  simply by  the idea of  success in  one of 
one’s rational  aims.  The point  is  a general one: a life is  made 
better  by  succeeding in one’s projects and living up to the values 
one holds, provided these  are worthwhile; but  if  these aims are 
worthwhile  then  succeeding  in  them  will  also  make  one’s  life 
better in other ways.  This is true of  friendship because standing 
in this relation to others is itself  a good  (albeit one that depends 
on one’s having certain aims), and I believe that the same can be 
said of, for example, the achievement of various forms of excellence. 
It is an interesting question whether there are factors that con- 
tribute to well-being that are neither experiential nor dependent on 
a person’s aims in the broad way just described. It might be argued 
that there are not. In order for something to affect a person’s well- 
being, the argument might run, it must affect how things go for 
that  person. Both  experiential goods and factors  involved  with 
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how  anything else could do so.26 Physical health might be cited 
as a possible example, but it is not clear that it is one.  Would a 
person’s well-being in the sense we have been discussing  (that is 
to say, the quality of  her life)  be diminished by  the pathological 
functioning of  some internal organ, if  this did not affect either the 
quality of  her experience or the achievement  of  goods connected 
with her aims? If, for example, she died in an accident before this 
condition became apparent, it would be true that while she was 
alive her health was less good than she thought, but not clear that 
her life was therefore worse than it would have been had she been 
entirely healthy up to the end. 
Leaving this question open, I conclude that any plausible theory 
of  well-being would have to recognize at least the following fixed 
points.  First, certain experiential states (such as various forms of 
satisfaction  and  enjoyment)  contribute to well-being,  but  well- 
being is not determined solely by the quality of experience. Second, 
well-being depends to a large extent on a person’s degree of  suc- 
cess in achieving his or her main ends in life, provided that these 
are worth pursuing.  This component of well-being reflects the fact 
that the life of  a rational creature is something that is to be lived
in an active sense - that is to say, shaped by his or her choices and 
reactions - and that well-being is therefore in large part a matter 
of  how well this is done - of  how well the ends are selected and 
how successfully they  are pursued.  Third, many goods that con- 
tribute to a person’s well-being depend on the person’s aims but 
go beyond the good of  success in achieving those aims.  These in- 
clude such things as friendship, other valuable personal relations, 
and the achievement of various forms of excellence, such as in art 
or science. 
These intuitive fixed points provide the basis for rough judg- 
ments of comparative well-being: a person’s well-being is certainly 
2 6   L.W. Sumner calls this the “subject-relative of perspectival character” of the 
concept  of welfare.  See  Welfare, Happiness and  Ethics, p. 42. His requirement  is 
obviously  similar  to  but  seems broader  than  Kagan’s,  discussed  in  note  18 above. 
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increased if  her life is improved in one of  the respects just men- 
tioned  while  the others  are held constant.  But  this list of  fixed 
points does not amount to a theoryof  well-being.  Such a theory 
would go beyond this list by  doing such things as the following. 
It might provide a more unified account of  what well-being is, on 
the basis  of  which  one could  see why  the diverse  things  I have 
listed as contributing to well-being in fact do so.  It might also pro- 
vide  a clearer account of  the boundary of  the concept - the line 
between  contributions to one’s well-being and things one has rea- 
son to pursue for other reasons.  Finally, such a theory might pro- 
vide  a  standard  for  making  more  exact  comparisons  of  well- 
being - for deciding when, on balance, a person’s well-being has 
been increased or decreased and by  how much. 
I doubt that we are likely to find a theory of well-being of  this 
kind.  It does  not  seem likely,  for example,  that we will  find  a 
general theory  telling us how much  weight  to assign to the dif- 
ferent elements of  well-being I have listed: how much to enjoy- 
ment, how much to success in one’s aims, and so on. I doubt that 
these questions have answers at this level of  abstraction.  Plausible 
answers would depend on the particular  goals that a person has 
and on the circumstances in which he or she was placed.  Perhaps 
a theory might tell us which goals to adopt, or at least which ones 
not to adopt.  It does seem that there are answers to such ques- 
tions, but  I  do not think that they  are likely to be delivered by 
anything that could be called a general theory.  Even if  there were 
such a theory, moreover,  it would need to be not just a theory of 
well-being, but  a more general account of  what is valuable  and 
worthwhile. 
One thing that philosophical reflection can do is to tell us more 
about particular goals: what is good or bad about them, how they 
are related to each other, and how their value is to be understood. 
There is  certainly much to be learned in this way even if  it does 
not, for the reasons just stated, amount to a theory, or to a theory 
of  well-being. Conclusions of  this kind can be useful to us in decid-119
ing how to live our lives.  But from a first-person point of  view it 
does not matter very much whether a more general and ambitious 
theory  of  well-being is possible or not, since we do not need an- 
swers to the questions that it would  answer.  This is true in part 
because, as I will  argue in the next section, the concept of  well- 
being in general and its boundaries in particular are less important 
from the point of view of  the person whose life is in question than 
is often supposed. 
4.THE IMPORTANCE  OF WELL-BEING: 
FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVES 
There are two related  ways  in  which  the importance  of  the 
concept of  well-being in a given mode of thinking might be shown. 
First, it might be shown in the role that concept plays in explain- 
ing and helping us to understand the importance of the particular 
things that contribute to well-being.  Second, it might be shown in 
the significance of  the boundary of  that concept - the difference 
it  makes  whether  something is  or is not a contribution  to well- 
being.  I will argue that insofar as the concept of  well-being has 
importance of either of these two kinds this is mainly from a third-
person  point  of  view,  such as that of  a benefactor, or from the 
point of  view of  moral theory.  From the point of view of the per- 
son  whose  well-being  it  is,  the concept of  well-being  does  not 
appear to be significant in either of these two ways. 
There are at least two levels of practical thinking at which the 
idea  of  one’s own  well-being  might be significant.  It might  be 
significant in everyday decisions about what to do or what particu- 
lar goals to aim at, or it might play a role in larger-scale decisions 
about  how one’s life is to go, such as what career to pursue or 
whether or not to be  a parent.  Taking the former case first, it is 
certainly  true that we have reason, in “everyday” decisions about 
what to do, to aim at things that contribute directly to our well- 
being, intuitively understood.  We  have reason to seek enjoyment, 
for example, to avoid illness and injury, and to do what will pro-
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mote  success  in  achieving  our  aims.  But  the idea of  well-being 
plays little if  any role in explaining why we have reason to value 
these things.  If  you ask me why I listen to music, I may reply that 
I do so because I enjoy it. If you asked why that is a reason, the 
reply, “A life that includes enjoyment is a better life,” would not 
be false,but it would be rather strange. Similarly, it would be odd 
to explain why I strive to succeed in philosophy by saying that my 
life will be a better life if  I am successful in my main aims, insofar 
as they are rational.  Again, this is true, but does not provide the 
right kind of reason. It would make more sense to say that I work 
hard at philosophy because I believe it is worthwhile, or because I 
enjoy it, or even because I long for the thrill of  success.  But  it 
would be empty to add that these things in turn are desirable be- 
cause they make my life better.  Enjoyments, success in one’s main 
aims,  and substantive goods  such as friendship all contribute to 
well-being, but the idea of  well-being plays little role in explaining 
why  they are good.  This might be put by  saying that well-being 
is what is sometimes called an “inclusive good” - one that is made 
up of other things that are good in their own right, not made good 
by their contributions to it. 
But even if  well-being has little role to play in explaining why 
the things that contribute to it are good, it might still constitute a 
significant category of goods.  One way in which this might be true 
would be if  losses in well-being of  one kind could be fully made 
up for by  other gains in well-being, but not by  considerations of 
other kinds.  Even if other considerations constitute good reason for 
accepting a loss in well-being, this loss remains a loss, but (the sug- 
gestion runs) when we give up one element of well-being for another 
(such as when we give up a pleasure now for the sake of an equal or 
greater pleasure later) there is no real loss. This might be put by say- 
ing that well-being constitutes a distinct “sphere of compensation.” 
This idea is appealing, but mistaken.  We  do speak of  making 
a sacrifice when, for example, we give up comfort and leisure for 
the sake of  a family member or a friend, or for the good of  some 121
group, team, or institution of which we are a member.  But it also 
feels like a sacrifice when we give up present comfort and leisure 
for the sake of  our own longer life or future health.  The fact that 
in the latter case we will be “paid back” in the same coin, our own 
well-being,  does not make this case feel less like a sacrifice than 
the other at the time that it is made.  The term “sacrifice” is ap- 
propriate in both cases because we give up something of  present, 
palpable appeal for the sake of some other, possibly more distant 
concern. This is often difficult to do,  and the difficulty is not erased 
in the latter case by  the fact that this concern is for our own future 
welfare.  One might reply that it should be erased, and would be 
if  we were fully rational.  But why should this be so in one case 
but not in the other? In both cases we are giving up something 
that we have reason to want for the sake of some other considera- 
tion that we judge to be more important.  The idea that in one case 
there is no real sacrifice because we are paid back in kind is belied 
by  the experience of making such choices as well as by an examina- 
tion  of  the reasons  supporting the alternatives when  considered 
alone. If present and future experiential goods were desirable only 
because of  the contribution  they make to some separate good- 
my  net well-being  (or the net experiential quality of  my  life) -
then giving up present comfort and leisure for the sake of greater 
comfort later would be no sacrifice at all.  As I have argued above, 
however,  this  does  not seem to be the case: well-being is  more 
plausibly seen as an inclusive good. 
In arguing against the idea that well-being is a distinct sphere 
of compensation I have been arguing, in effect, that the notion of 
net well-being is of little importance from the point of view of the 
person  whose well-being  is  in  question.  This conclusion  is also 
supported by  the fact that from an individual’s own point of  view 
the  boundaries  of  well-being  are  blurred  because  many  of  the 
things that contribute to it are valued primarily for other reasons. 
In order to arrive at an estimate of  our net well-being we would 
need to determine the contribution that succeeding in these aims 
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makes to our well-being, separating this both from the other rea- 
sons for pursuing them and from the costs in well-being that this 
pursuit may involve.  It does not seem, however, that we have need 
to make his kind of calculation. 
Consider, for example, the reasons that move us to promote the 
interests of  our families and of  groups or institutions with which 
we have other special relations.  These reasons are often seen as 
having an ambiguous status. Viewed in relation to our own com- 
fort and leisure, they seem “altruistic,” but from the point of  view 
of  what is sometimes called “impersonal morality” the reasons one 
has to promote the interests of  one’s family, one’s group, or one’s 
team or institution appear “self-referential” if not fully “Self-
regarding.”  This ambiguity is also  apparent  from a first-person 
point of  view: on the one hand, we would not want to think that 
we promote  the interests of  our friends, family, and institutions 
for “selfish” reasons, but, on the other hand, we would not be good 
friends or family members or loyal members of  our institutions if 
we did not feel a loss to them as a loss to us.  From a first-person 
point of  view, however, we have no reason  to resolve this ambi- 
guity by  deciding where  the limits of  our well-being  should be 
drawn.  It is of  course important to us-important in our moral 
self-assessment - that our concern  for our friends and family is 
not grounded entirely in benefits they bring to us.  But, given that 
we do care about our family or friends, we have no need to deter- 
mine the degree to which we benefit from benefiting them. 
This point is not limited to cases of  what is sometimes called 
“self-referential altruism,” such as concern for friends and family. 
As  I argued above, success in one’s main rational aims is an im- 
portant component of  well-being.  But we generally pursue these 
aims for reasons other than the contribution that this success will 
make to our well-being, and from a first-person point of view there 
is little reason to try to estimate this contribution. 
It might be objected that I have obscured the distinctive role of 
an agent’s own well-being in his or her practical reasoning by con-123
sidering only the contrast  (or lack of  it) between  considerations 
of  well-being  and other  ends  that a  person  in  fact  cares  about 
(with good reason). What is distinctive about well-being and the 
goods that make it up, it may be claimed, is that in contrast to 
other aims, which a person can adopt or not without rational de- 
fect, one’s own well-being marks out a category of  considerations 
that it is irrational not to care about. 
This objection  relies  on  a  misuse  of  the charge  of  “irratio- 
nality.’’ To see this, consider two kinds of cases in which a charge 
of  irrationality might be made.  There certainly are some cases in 
which  people’s failure to give weight  to considerations of  well- 
being is irrational.  These are cases in which a person judges that 
these  considerations are reasons  but  then  fails to take them into 
account in deciding what to do or fails to give them the weight 
that he or she judges them to have.  This is what is usually going 
on when we fail to floss our teeth or fail to wear seat belts or fail 
to do other things that we can see we have reason to do because 
they will promote our present or future aims.  Cases of  this kind 
are extremely common, and this may explain the widespread ten- 
dency to cite failure to give weight to considerations of one’s own 
well-being  as  the  prime  example of  irrationality.  But  there  is 
nothing in these cases that has to do particularly with well-being. 
They are merely instances of  the general truth that it is irrational 
to fail to give a consideration the weight that one judges it should 
have. 
There are other cases in which a person fails to give weight to 
the fact that something would promote her well-being because she 
fails  to  see  that it provides  her  with  a reason  or perhaps  even 
judges that it does not.  For example, a person might deny, either 
naively or on the basis of  some sophisticated philosophical view, 
that the fact that an action would promote one of  her future in- 
terests gives her any reason  at all, now, to do it.  This may be a 
mistake, and if so the person is open to rational criticism.  But this 
does not make her irrational, except in the (overly)  broad sense in 
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which  a person  is irrational whenever  he or she fails to see that 
some consideration provides her with a reason.  Here again, there 
is  no  special  connection  between  well-being  and rationality.  If 
there is irrationality in these cases, it is of  a perfectly general sort, 
which could arise with respect to any reason. 
In the argument of  this section so far, I have been considering 
the role of  well-being in everyday decisions about what to do.  I 
conclude from the arguments I have given that while the particular 
things that contribute to one’s well-being - things such as enjoy- 
ments, health, and success in one’s central  aims - are important 
sources of  reasons in our everyday decisions about what to do, the 
concept  of  well-being itself, the boundaries  of  this concept,  and 
estimates of  the net effect that particular decisions would have on 
our well-being do not have a very significant role to play.  In retro- 
spect, this may not seem surprising.  It would be odd to make our 
everyday choices as “artists of  life” choosing each action with an 
eye to producing the best life, as an artist might select dots of paint 
with the aim of improving the value of  the whole canvas.  But we 
might expect the role of  the idea of  well-being to become more 
important when we shift from everyday decisions about particular 
actions to longer-range choices about what career to follow, where 
to live, or whether to have a family.  Surely, it might be thought, 
when  we are  adopting our  most  comprehensive  goals  what we 
should be looking for are those that will make for the best life. If 
this is  so, then  well-being will  also play  a crucial, although less 
obvious, role in everyday decisions.  Even if  we do not aim at our 
own well-being in many of  these ordinary choices, they will none- 
theless  be  “controlled  by”  more comprehensive plans  that, ulti- 
mately, are appraised on the grounds of the quality of the life they 
offer “from the point of view of  the person who lives it.” 
A maximally  comprehensive  goal,  if  one  had  such  a  thing, 
would be a conception of  “how to live,” but it would be mislead- 
ing to call such a goal a conception  of  well-being.  Viewed  from 
within  (from the point of  view of the person whose goal it is)  a 125
comprehensive goal is not simply a conception of  well-being since 
the reasons that it provides derive from the aims and values that it 
includes, and as we have seen these will generally include reasons 
that are not grounded in the well-being of  the person in question. 
Viewed “from without”  (from the point of  view of  someone de- 
ciding which comprehensive goal to adopt), it may be true that such 
a goal should be selected with the aim of finding the plan that will 
make for “the best life.”  But what this phrase means here is the 
most choiceworthy life. As I argued above, the question of choice-
worthiness is not the same as the question of  well-being, since it 
makes sense to say that a person had good reason to choose a cer- 
tain plan  of  life even  though it involved a lower  level of  well- 
being - was worse from the point of view of the person who lived 
it—than  some available alternative. This life might be more 
choiceworthy because of its greater value, for example, or because 
it offered  the only  way  of  fulfilling  an obligation  to care for a 
relative. 
Even if  the question to be asked in choosing a plan of life is the 
question  of  choiceworthiness  rather  than  the  question  of  well- 
being, however, this still leaves open the possibility that one’s well- 
being  may  play  a particularly  important  role in  answering  this 
question.  The fact that a person  could have reason to adopt one 
plan of  life despite the fact that it offered a lower level of  well- 
being than some alternative may show that choiceworthiness  and 
well-being are not the same thing.  But the fact that it could make 
sense to make the opposite choice - for example, to reject a life of 
devotion to some project because of the sacrifices in well-being that 
it would involve - seems to show that well-being is at least one 
important factor in such choices. 
Many of  the things that contribute to one’s well-being, such as 
health, enjoyments, and freedom from pain  and distress, are cer- 
tainly important factors in such a choice.  The idea of overall well- 
being may also play a role, but this is less clear, in part because the 
notion of  well-being that can be appealed to in this context is un-
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avoidably abstract and indeterminate.27 Success in one’s main aims 
is, as we have seen, an important element in well-being.  But the 
stage we are now considering is one at which these aims are being 
chosen, so it is not yet known what will promote our well-being by 
contributing to our success in achieving them.  Well-being becomes 
much more determinate only once our central aims are chosen. 
In deciding what aims to adopt, we may  of  course give some 
weight  to the consideration  that since success in our aims makes 
for a better  life this provides some reason to choose aims that we 
can achieve, and to prefer a life in which we can achieve the aims 
we choose. But while this is aconsideration it does not seem to be 
a very significant one.  In many cases we have independent reasons 
not to adopt aims that are utterly futile, since pursuing them will 
make no contribution to the values that make them worthwhile. 
In addition, the bare idea of  “accomplishment” - success in one’s 
rational aims whatever these may be - is a very abstract goal and 
has  less  weight  than  the  value of  particular  goals that we  may 
adopt. When, for example, Leo Tolstoy’s character Ivan Ilych
surveys his life and finds it wanting, what he regrets is not the lack 
of  accomplishment  in  this  abstract  sense.  His distress has  force 
because it is more concrete: what bothers him is the fact that he 
has devoted his life to things that now strike him as unimportant 
and neglected others that would have been worthwhile.28 
Aside from the two practical standpoints I have considered -
the one we adopt when making everyday choices and the one we 
adopt when making decisions about larger-scale life plans - there 
is also the point of  view we adopt when we step back from a life 
and ask, without either of these practical ends in view, how good a 
life it is.  The idea of  well-being may have a greater role in this 
kind  of  evaluation.  This is  suggested  by  the fact that when we 
take up this point of  view we are likely to consider features of  a 
life considered as a whole, not merely the value of  particular ele-
27 A  point emphasized by Raz. See The Morality of Freedom, p. 345.
28 Leo Tolstoy,The Death of Ivan Ilych and Other Stories. 127
ments within it.  From this point of  view, for example, we might 
say  that a life is  better  if  it  is  “well-balanced”  and involves re- 
sponses to the achievement of  a variety of  goods, or that a life that 
begins badly but ends in success and happiness is a better life than 
one that contains the same particular goods differently arranged, 
so that it begins well but ends badly.”  Of course, most lives that 
begin  well but end badly differ in experiential quality from lives 
that are otherwise similar but have the opposite trajectory, and one 
advantage of  a well-balanced  life may also be that exclusive con- 
centration on a few goals yields diminishing returns both in enjoy- 
ment  and in  what is accomplished.  The claims I have in mind, 
however, hold  that,  even  leaving aside these more concrete  dif- 
ferences, a well-balanced life, or a life with an upward trajectory, 
is a better life for the person who lives it.  These claims, and the 
evaluative standpoint from which they are made, are quite intelli- 
gible.  Perhaps the claims are even correct.  But they do not strike 
me as very important.  Well-being in this refined sense is not the 
central notion by which our lives should be guided. 
I  conclude,  therefore, that the concept  of  one’s overall well- 
being does not play as important a role as it is generally thought 
to do in the practical thinking of a rational individual.  Succeeding 
in one’s main aims, insofar as these are rational, must be a com- 
ponent in any plausible notion of  well-being.  But this idea serves 
as an evaluative Trojan horse, bringing within the notion of well- 
being values that are not grounded in it.  From an individual’s own 
perspective,  which  takes  his  or  her  main  goals  as  given,  what 
matters are these goals and other particular values, not the idea of 
well-being that they make up.  From a more abstract perspective, 
at which these goals are not yet determined, we can say that a life 
goes better if  the person is more successful in achieving his or her 
main rational goals, but the conception of  well-being that can be 
29 The latter is suggested by J.David Velleman, who also suggests that one life is 
better  than  another  if  it  constitutes  “a better  life story.”  See his “Well-Being and 
Time,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72  (1991): 48-77. 
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formulated at this level is too indeterminate, and too abstract, to be 
of great weight. 
Concentrating on well-being in the latter sense, and hence on 
the contribution that success in one’s rational goals makes to the 
quality of  one’s life, has two effects that are distortions from the 
person’s own point of view.  Since well-being is a state, which is to 
be “brought about,” one effect of concentrating on well-being is to 
represent all values as ones that are teleological in form.  But this 
is not how things seem from the point of  view of a person whose 
rational aims include commitments to values that are not teleologi- 
cal.  An individual who rationally holds these values has reason to 
deliberate and to act as they require, but this is not the same thing 
as  seeking to maximize  the degree to which  one’s actions,  over 
one’s whole life, are in conformity with these values. 
Concentrating on well-being also has the effect of transforming 
all of  a person’s aims into what appear to be self-interested ones. 
This point might be put by noting that there are two ways in which 
the idea of “the good for p, ”  where p  is some individual, might be 
understood. In the first, broader sense, “the good for p” includes 
all those things that p has reason to aim at and to value- “the 
good,” from p’  spoint of view.30 But “the good for p”  can also be 
understood in a narrower sense in which it includes things just 
insofar as they are good forp  ,that is to say, insofar as they benefit 
p  by making his or her life better. The idea of well-being has a 
similar dual character. When we say that something contributes to 
a person’s well-being it sounds as if we are saying that it benefits 
him or her. But from an individual’s own point of view many of 
the things that contribute to his or her well-being are valued for 
quite other reasons.31 From this point of view the idea of one’s 
30 Peter Railton, for example, understands “an individual’s good” in this 
broader sense. It consists, he says, in “what he would want himself to want, or 
pursue” if he were to contemplate his present situation from a more ideal perspec- 
tive. See p. 16 of “Facts and Values,” Philosophical Topics 24 (1986): 5-31. 
31 David Wiggins makes a similar point about the “instability” of desire-based 
accounts of value. The claim that something is good because it would satisfy a per-12 9
own well-being is transparent. When we focus on it, it largely dis- 
appears, leaving only the values that make it up.32
5.  THE IMPORTANCE OF WELL-BEING: 
THIRD-PERSON PERSPECTIVES 
These effects of  concentrating on well-being cease to be distor- 
tions when we shift from a first-person point of  view to the per- 
spective of a benefactor, such as a friend or parent. A  benefactor 
has reason to do what will benefit his or her intended beneficiary 
and to do it because that person will  benefit.33 So the analog of 
what was,  from the first-person point  of  view, a distorting  self- 
centeredness is not a problem from this perspective.  Nor is there 
son’s desire, as  a claim  about what  is good,  is one that  should be  endorsable from 
that  person’s  own  point  of  view.  But from that point  of  view  it is  not  the desire 
that matters (“Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life,” Proceedings of  theBritish 
Academy  [1976]: 346-47).  What I am arguing is that this instability is not merely 
a  feature  of  desire-based  views  but  one  that  will  be  inherited  by  any plausible  ac- 
count of  well-being,  since any  such account must give a place  to the idea of  success 
in one’s rational  aims and  that idea  in turn captures the element of  truth in desire-
based  views.  The lesson  to  be  drawn  is  that  the  notion  of  well-being  should  be 
treated  with some care, since it is, as I will argue in the next section, an evaluative 
idea that has its home in third-person perspectives but is often passed off  as a central 
notion in first-person deliberation. 
3 2   The two distortions I have mentioned (the transformation into apparently 
self-interested  goals  and  into  a  teleological  form)  are  combined  in  objections  to 
deontology  that  interpret  an  agent’s  concern  not  to  act wrongly  as  a concern with 
preserving his own moral purity - that is to say, with gaining for himself  the good 
of  having succeeded in conforming to his own principles. 
33 Stephen Darwall notes a similar divergence of points of view in “Self-Interest 
and Self-Concern,”  Social  Philosophy  and  Policy  14(1997): 158-78.  Darwall iden- 
tifies  a person’s good,  or  interest, with what  someone who cares  about that person 
would  rationally want  for him  for his  sake  (see,  e.g., p. 76),and he stresses  the 
divergence between a person’s good, so understood, and what that person has reason 
to want.  Darwall suggests  that “the idea of  a person’s good or interest ...is one 
we  need  insofar  as  we  (or he)  care about  him”  (p.  159).  As the  parenthetical 
qualification indicates, he holds, plausibly,  that the contrast in question is not, strictly 
speaking, one between first- and third-person perspectives,  since a person can be con- 
cerned with his own interest in this  sense - that is to say, can  take the perspective 
of  a benefactor  toward himself.  I agree that one can  take this perspective,  but deny 
that it is a perspective that has particular importance for us.  For one thing, as noted 
above,  this  attitude is  incompatible with  the attitude that we  normally  take toward 
many  of  our own aims, which we value for reasons that do not refer  to our interest. 
As I note  in the text  this tension  is greatly reduced  when  the benefactor  is another 
person. 
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a problem of transparency: our benefactors’ reasons generally take 
a different form than our own, even though they arise from reasons 
that we have.  Consider three classes of  such reasons. 
In the first class of cases, I have reason to do certain things be- 
cause I will benefit from them: I have reason to do what will bring 
me pleasure,  for example, what will  relieve  my  pain, what will 
extend my life, and what will insure my comfort in the future.  In 
the second class of  cases I also have reason  to do certain things 
because of  their relation to me: I have reason to promote the safety 
and security of  my parents and children, for example, to do what 
will benefit my  friends, and to promote the glory of  my city.  But 
in these cases my  reasons  are not  (or need not be)  grounded in 
imagined benefits to myself.  In the third class of  cases my  choice 
of certain aims may not depend on any relation to me at all.  I may, 
for example, work to prevent Venice from collapsing or to save the 
rain forest.  Insofar as these are my  aims, however, succeeding in 
them makes my life better.  So, taking these three classes together, 
from my  point of  view the range of  things I have reason to pro- 
mote, whether or not it is broader than the class of things that will 
benefit me, is at least broader than the class of things I have reason 
to promote because they will benefit me. 
From my  benefactor’s point  of  view, however, benefiting me 
has special significance.  In the first of  the three classes just listed, 
the reason my benefactor has to promote things  (my pleasure, my 
health, and so on) is the same as my own. My benefactor may also 
have reason  to promote the things listed in my  second class (the 
health and comfort of  my  family, the flourishing of  my  city)  be- 
cause  of  their  connection  with  me, but  in  these  cases  the bene- 
factor’s reasons differ from mine.  If my benefactor saves my child 
or my parents, or restores some buildings in my city, and does this 
qua benefactor, that is to say,  for me, he is doing it because he sees 
this as benefiting  me in some way, or at least because I want it. 
In my own case, by contrast, I would hope not to be moved by  such 
reasons: I see myself  as acting for the sake of  others.  Finally, in 131
the third class of  cases, while I might imagine a wealthy benefactor 
who saved Venice saying that he did it for me, meaning just that 
he did it because he knew I wanted Venice to survive, this seems 
odd (as well as unlikely). This is partly because this reason is so 
clearly distinct from the reasons why Venice is worth saving, which 
have nothing to do with me.  It makes more sense to think of my 
benefactor as contributing to my campaign to save Venice, in order 
that that campaign should succeed.  Here the connection with me 
is more plausible although, again, it is a connection that I hope is 
not crucial to my own motivation. 
These examples illustrate two points. The first is the divergence 
between the first-person and third-person outlooks.  The second is 
that it is not clear how important the boundaries of well-being are, 
even from a benefactor’s point of  view.  I have been speaking so 
far of  “a benefactor,” understood as someone who has reason to 
do what benefits me (that is to say, contributes to my  well-being), 
and I have spoken as if  friends, parents, and spouses are all bene- 
factors in this sense.  But this way of  putting things is too sche- 
matic.  It is not always clear  that someone who stands in one of 
these relations to us therefore has reason to do what will “make 
our life go better,” as opposed to reason to help us to do what we 
have reason to want to do, whether or not this will conduce to our 
well-being.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  I  have  good  reason  to 
pursue a career  as an artist, or as a labor organizer, even though 
this may lead to a lower level of  well-being for me overall.  Sup- 
pose also that I cannot do this without help from some friends or 
family members. Do they have reason to help me? It seems to me 
that they may.34 But the answer may depend on the nature of  the 
relation that the person stands in to me -whether it is a friend, a 
lover, a parent, or some other family member.  Just clarifying the 
notion of well-being will not settle the matter. 
34 Darwall considers a similar example in “Self-Interest and Self-Concern,” 
pp.  174-75.  He suggests that in such a case  a benefactor’s concern  for the person 
for her sake may  be in tension with “respect and concern for her as an autonomous 
agent.” 
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Both of  these points - the lack of  transparency  and the fact 
that  while  well-being  may  be  significant  it  does  not  provide  a 
uniquely  important  definition  of  the concern  that others should 
have for us - are apparent also from a moral perspective, to which 
I will now turn. 
6.THE IMPORTANCE OF WELL-BEING: 
MORAL PERSPECTIVE 
As I remarked at the beginning of  this lecture, it is commonly 
supposed that there is a single notion of  individual well-being that 
(1) serves as a basis for the decisions of  a single rational  indi- 
vidual, at least as far as he or she alone is concerned  (that is to 
say,  leaving  aside  moral  obligations  and concerns  for  others) ;
(2)is what a concerned benefactor, such as a friend or parent, has 
reason to promote; and  (3)is the basis on which an individual’s 
interests are taken  into account in moral argument.  This notion 
of  well-being is  assumed to admit of  at least  rough quantitative 
comparisons  of  levels  and  increments  and to be  independent of 
morality. 
If  what I have argued so far is correct, however, then at least 
the first part of  this  common  assumption  is mistaken.  The par- 
ticular  goods  that  make  up well-being  are  important  from  the 
point of  view of  the individual whose well-being it is, and we can 
make  and need  to make at least rough  quantitative comparisons 
within  these dimensions of  well-being  (comparisons  of  levels of 
comfort and enjoyment, for example).  But the boundary between 
one’s own well-being and other aims is unclear, and we have no 
need to clarify it.  It does not matter that quantitative comparisons 
of  levels or increments of  our own overall well-being are difficult 
to make.  We  rightly view the world through a framework of  rea- 
sons, largely shaped by the aims and values that we have adopted, 
and we rightly make particular decisions by determining what these 
reasons support on balance, not by comparing net changes in our 
overall balance of well-being.  Among these reasons are those pro- 133
vided by  ideas of  right and wrong, justice, and other moral values. 
These values  constitute some of  an  individual’s most  important 
“aims” in the sense I have been discussing, and they also play an im- 
portant role in shaping a person’s other goals, including the most 
comprehensive ones.  It follows that an individual has little use for a 
notion of  well-being that abstracts from moral considerations. 
In light of  this, it is reasonable to ask why it should have been 
thought  that there was  a  notion  of  well-being  of  the kind  just 
described, one that plays a central role both in individual decisions 
and in moral  argument.  One explanation is that this is another 
instance of  “the shadow of hedonism.”  If  what an individual had 
reason to do  (leaving others aside) was simply to promote his or 
her own pleasure, and if what morality required of us was simply 
to give positive weight to promoting the net pleasure of  others, 
then something close to the picture described above would be cor- 
rect.  There would  be a single notion of  well-being  (in this case 
pleasure)  that played  the role described both  in  individual and 
moral  thinking  and  in  the  thinking of  a  concerned  benefactor. 
This notion would  be defined independently of  any moral ideas 
about what an individual was  entitled to or what he or she was 
obligated to do, and it would admit of  quantitative comparisons. 
One possibility, then, is that the idea that there is a notion of well- 
being with these properties results  from supposing that although 
hedonism is false there must be some other notion that plays this 
same role. 
The idea that there must be such a notion might also arise from 
what are taken to be the needs of moral theory. A  theory of the 
morality of  right and wrong might rely on a notion of  well-being 
in  three ways.  First,  this  notion  might figure in  the content  of 
moral requirements.  For example, we may be morally required, at 
least in certain circumstances, to promote the well-being of  others, 
giving preference to those whose well-being we can improve the 
most or to those whose level of  well-being is the lowest.  Second, 
well-being might play a role in the justification of moral principles 
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even when it does not figure in their content. A  principle requir- 
ing us to respect a certain right, for example, or to refrain  from 
treating any individual in specified ways, might be justified on the 
ground that its observance would promote individual well-being. 
On the view I have argued for, for example, principles are assessed 
by asking whether they could or could not be reasonably rejected.35
So some basis is needed for assessing the force of various possible 
grounds for rejecting  principles, and it might be thought  that a 
notion of  well-being is needed to provide this basis:  that, for ex- 
ample, the strength of  a person’s objection to a principle is prop- 
erly measured by  the cost that this principle would have for that 
person’s well-being, or by  the level of  well-being to which  he or 
she would be reduced if it were accepted. Third, insofar as a moral 
theory needs to provide some justification for morality as a whole- 
some answer to the question, “Why be moral?” - it might seem, 
again, that  this  is  best  supplied  by  showing how  morality  con- 
tributes to each person’s well-being. 
The first and second of  these  tasks require a notion  of  well- 
being  that admits of  quantitative  comparisons.  The second and 
third  appear to require a notion  that is important to individuals 
and independent of  morality itself.  It would seem to be circular 
to justify  moral  principles  on grounds that already presupposed 
what people were entitled to, and it would seem that an interesting 
answer to the question, “Why be moral?” must proceed by  linking 
morality  to  something  that  individuals  can  be  assumed  to care 
about  without  supposing  that  they  are  already  concerned  with 
morality  itself.  Putting  these points  together, we seem to reach 
the conclusion that moral theory  requires a notion  of  well-being 
with the properties listed above.  It therefore seems to be an im- 
portant task for moral theory to come up with a systematic account 
of  well-being that meets these requirements. 
35 See “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” in A.  Sen and B. Williams, eds., 
Utilitarianism and  Beyond  pp.103-28.135
This line of  thinking may be in part responsible for the wide- 
spread  belief  that there is  a notion  of  well-being  of  the kind I 
have described, and it would explain the emphasis generally given 
to theories of  well-being within moral philosophy.  As a substan- 
tive matter, however, I do not believe that these claims about the 
importance of  well-being for moral theory are sound.  To explain 
briefly why I think this, I will say a few words here about each of 
three ways in which a theory of right and wrong might be thought 
to rely upon a notion of  well-being: in the content of moral prin- 
ciples, in the justification offered  for these principles, and in the 
justification of morality as a whole. 
First, as to content, there certainly  are some moral principles 
whose content involves overall assessments of how well-off various 
individuals are.  The clearest examples are principles for assessing 
the justice of  social institutions and policies.  Applying these prin- 
ciples  often requires us  to make comparative judgments  of  how 
well-off  different people are, or would be under alternative poli- 
cies, and perhaps also judgments about the relative magnitude of 
these changes.  Moreover, the notions of  better-off  and worse-off 
that are employed here are not transparent in the way noted above: 
the fact that a certain change in someone’s situation would make 
that person better-off in the relevant sense gives that change moral 
significance,  and  it  is  therefore  important  to  draw  clearly  the 
boundary  between  those  changes that do and those  that do not 
have  significance of  this  kind.  This is  therefore  a place  where 
something like a theory of well-being seems to be needed, and it is 
noteworthy  that most  of  the systematic accounts  that have been 
offered of  how well-off a person is have in fact been developed to 
serve the needs of such principles. 
These accounts  do not, however, generally coincide with  the 
intuitive notion of individual well-being.  They are either broader 
than  this  notion,  as  are  the  utility  functions  underlying  social 
choice theories as I interpreted them above, or else narrower, as are 
such notions as Rawls’s primary social goods or Sen’s  capability sets. 
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These notions are all shaped by moral ideas arising from the particu- 
lar moral questions that they are supposed to answer: in the case of 
social choice theory by  the idea that citizens’ preferences should be 
taken into account in shaping social decisions, and in the case of 
Rawls'sand Sen’s accounts by ideas about the line between those as- 
pects of individuals’ situations that are the responsibility of social in- 
stitutions and those that are properly left to individuals themselves. 
There may, of  course, be other moral principles whose content 
is  specified in terms of  something closer to the intuitive idea  of 
well-being. For example, there might be a principle of benevolence 
requiring us to promote the well-being of others insofar as we can 
do so without great sacrifice. A  theory of well-being might then 
be needed in order to interpret this duty.  But it does not seem to 
me, intuitively, that the duty of benevolence that we owe to others 
in general in fact takes this form - that is to say, a form that re- 
quires us to clarify the boundaries of well-being and to make over- 
all  assessments of  the quality of  various lives.  Parents certainly 
have reason to want their children’s lives to go as well as possible, 
taking into account all the various elements of well-being, and they 
may be open  to moral criticism when  they  fail to promote this. 
But this is a special case, and the concern we owe to others in gen- 
eral is more limited.  We are certainly required to avoid harming 
or interfering with  others, and to benefit  them in  specific ways, 
such as by  relieving their pain and distress, at least when we can 
do so without great sacrifice.  But these duties do not, it seems to 
me, derive from a more general duty to promote their well-being, 
and we therefore do not need a theory of well-being in order to 
figure out what our duties to aid others require of  us.  I may, of 
course, be mistaken about this.  There may be a more general duty 
of  this kind, but  if  there is such a duty, its content, like that of 
the principles of justice referred to above, will be shaped by  moral 
considerations.  It is not simply provided by a notion derived from 
the realm of  individual rationality, where, as I have argued above, 
the idea of  overall well-being in any event plays little role. 137
Even  if  the idea  of  individual well-being  does not figure ex- 
plicitly in the content of  moral principles or principles of  justice, 
however, it might be suggested that this notion plays a role at the 
deeper  level  at which  these principles  are justified.  So, for ex- 
ample, in arriving at standards for the justice of  distributions we 
might  start  from the  idea  of  individual  well-being  as the most 
basic ground for assessing a person’s situation, and then ask which 
of  the various things that promote well-being are properly the re- 
sponsibility of  social institutions and which are the responsibility 
of  individuals themselves.  If  the justification of  moral principles 
generally  followed  this  pattern,  then  it would  be  important  to 
clarify  the notion  of  well-being  in  order to have  a clearer  idea 
which principles are justified. 
It is true that when we are assessing the justifiability of  moral 
principles we must appeal to things that individuals have reason 
to want and that many of  these are things that contribute to well- 
being intuitively understood.  But not all of the reasons individuals 
have for rejecting principles are of  this form, so we cannot delimit 
the range of  considerations that figure in justification by  defining 
the boundaries of  well-being. 
Moreover,  the well-being of  any given individual is quite in- 
determinate until we know what his or her main aims are.  This 
means that at the level of argument at which we are choosing prin- 
ciples or policies to apply to individuals in general, well-being is 
not  yet  well  defined.  All we have to work  with  is  an  abstract 
notion  of  well-being that includes various  place holders, such as 
“success  in  one’s main  rational  aims,  whatever  these  may  be.” 
There are  two  ways  of  responding  to  this  indeterminacy.  One 
might argue that, although we cannot say, in advance, what will 
promote the well-being of  the particular individuals who will be 
affected by  a principle, we do know that individuals have reason 
to value well-being abstractly  described, and the principles  they 
have reason to accept will therefore be ones that include this notion 
in  their  content - such as principles  that tell us  to promote the 
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well-being of  particular individuals with whom we interact, whose 
well-being is determinate and can be known.  Alternatively, justi- 
fication can  appeal  to  more  specific forms of  opportunity, assis- 
tance,  and  forbearance  that we all have  reason  to want,  rather 
than  to  the idea  of  well-being  abstractly conceived.  This leads 
to a moral analog of Rawls’s primary social goods or Sen’s capa- 
bility sets. 
Another consequence of  the fact that what advances a person’s 
well-being depends on what aims he or she has adopted is that the 
content of well-being itself depends on decisions that are plausibly 
seen as the responsibility  of  the individual in question.  So  ques- 
tions of  responsibility  cannot  be  deferred  to the stage at which 
well-being is well defined and we are asking only what will pro- 
mote it.  In particular, deciding between the two strategies of justi- 
fication just described - between appealing to an abstract idea of 
well-being and appealing to concrete factors that contribute to it- 
involves a substantive moral choice.  It follows that, to the degree 
that the concept of  well-being plays  a role in the justification of 
moral principles, it does not serve as a starting point for justifica- 
tion  that is itself  without moral presuppositions.  This may  seem 
to pose a problem for moral theory, but I believe that it does not. 
While a justification for a moral principle would be circular if  it 
presupposed that principle itself, it is unnecessary and, I believe, 
unrealistic to demand that such justifications be free of  all moral 
con  tent. 
Let me turn, finally, to the possible  role of  well-being in an- 
swering the question,  “Why be moral?”  When a conception  of 
well-being figures in the content of  a moral principle, its bound- 
aries  mark  an  important  moral  distinction:  it is  thus not  trans- 
parent in the way that it becomes from a first-person point of view. 
The perspective of  a person who is applying such a principle is in 
this respect like that of  a benefactor, as I described it above.  But 
the question, “Why be moral?” is asked from a first-person point 
of  view.  That is to say, we are asking what reasons an individual 139 
has to take moral requirements seriously.  An answer must there- 
fore be  framed in  terms of  reasons  as they  appear to the agent 
whose  reasons they are.  From this point of  view, I have argued, 
the concept  of  well-being  is  largely transparent:  the things that 
make it up are important, but its boundaries are not.  The absence 
of  a clear boundary here would be a problem for moral theory if 
an explanation of  our reasons  for caring about right and wrong 
had to involve showing how this concern serves ends that can be 
certified as nonmoral.  But an account of  the motivational basis of 
right  and wrong need  not take this form.  It is enough to char- 
acterize  our  ideas  of  right  and wrong themselves  in  a way  that 
makes clear why they are worth caring about and how it can make 
sense, given the other things we have reason to value, to give them 
the importance that they claim. 
7. CONCLUSION :WELL-BEING NOT AMASTER VALUE 
I have tried in this lecture to characterize the intuitive idea of 
well-being and to identify the fixed points that any plausible ac- 
count of  this notion would have to include.  It would be absurd to 
deny that well-being is important - that it matters how well our 
lives go.  But I have argued that the concept of  well-being has less 
importance, or at least a different kind of  importance, than is com- 
monly supposed and that there is little to be gained by constructing 
a theory of well-being. 
From a first-person point of  view, the things that contribute to 
(one’s own)  well-being are obviously important, but the concept 
of  well-being plays little role in explaining why they are impor- 
tant, and the boundaries of  this concept  are not very significant, 
Well-being has its greatest significance from a third-person  point 
of  view,  such as that of  a benefactor,  and, at least arguably, in 
our thinking about right and wrong.  From both of  these perspec- 
tives it remains true that the things that contribute to a person’s 
well-being are important because of  their importance to that per- 
son.  But the importance of well-being as a category and the shape 
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and importance of particular conceptions of well-being derive from 
the distinctive  features of  those perspectives:  from the distinctive 
concerns of  a  (certain kind of) benefactor and from the special 
requirements of moral argument. 
Let me return, finally, to the idea that well-being is a “master 
value”:  that other things are valuable  only insofar  as they  con- 
tribute to individual well-being.  There is an element of  truth in 
this  idea,  but  put in  this  way  it invites misunderstanding.  The 
misunderstanding would be to take well-being to be a good sepa- 
rate  from other values,  which  are made valuable  in turn by  the 
degree to which  they promote it.  As we have seen, well-being is 
not a separate good in this sense.  It is best understood as an “in- 
clusive” good, and among the things that make a life more suc- 
cessful, and hence better for the person who lives it, is the success- 
ful pursuit of worthwhile goals.  Although successful pursuit of all 
of  these goals contributes to the agent’s well-being, this contribu- 
tion is not always what makes  them worthwhile.  In some cases, 
what makes an activity worthwhile is its contribution to the well- 
being of others, so in these cases well-being in general (one’s own 
and that of  others)  is what is fundamental.  But not all values are 
of  this kind.  Consider two classes of examples. 
The first are various moral values.  Treating others fairly may 
make my  life, and theirs, go better, but this is not my reason  for 
believing it to be worthwhile.  Rather, it is worthwhile because it 
is required by  the more general value of  treating others in ways 
that could be justified to them.  Living up to the requirements of 
this more general value may also make our lives better, by making 
it possible for us to live in greater harmony with one another.  But, 
again, this possible contribution to our well-being is not the only 
thing, or the most basic thing, that gives us reason to be concerned 
with what we owe to each other.  One more basic reason is the fact 
that this is part of what is required by our value as rational creatures. 
The second class of  examples are the values of  various forms 
of  excellence.  If  I devote my  life, or a part of  it, to research in 141
pure mathematics,  or  to  mastering  the rudiments  of  theoretical 
physics, these activities contribute to making my life better.  But 
what makes these pursuits worthwhile is not that contribution (or 
the possible contribution that their applications might make to the 
well-being of others) but rather the fact that they constitute serious 
attempts to understand deep and important questions. 
The element of truth in the idea that other things are valuable 
only  insofar  as  they  contribute to individual  well-being  is  this: 
A  reason to value something is a reason for us  to value it, that is to 
say, a reason to adopt certain attitudes toward it and to allow the 
idea of respect for, and perhaps pursuit of, that value to shape our 
lives in  certain  ways.  There are many  things that are of  value, 
and a person cannot respond to every value that there is.  Even so, 
it will be true of  most values that insofar as they are valuable at 
least some people have reason to respond to them in definite ways. 
If  so, then  responding in these ways  will count among their  ra- 
tional aims in the broad sense defined above, and their lives will 
be  more  successful,  hence  better,  if  they  so  respond.36 Perhaps 
there are some things that are of value - the grandeur of the uni- 
verse might be an example-  that no one is ever in a position to 
respond to in any way except passively, by being in awe of it, say. 
In such a case it might stretch the idea of success in one’s aims, and 
the idea of  well-being, too far to say that responding in this way 
made one’s life better.  If  there are such values, however, they are 
rare, and it remains true that most things are of value only if  they 
figure in the well-being of at least some individuals. 
But even if  there are no such values and it is therefore true 
that nothing is of value unless it contributes to  (or forms a part 
of) individual well-being, this still would not be true in the way 
that would be required to make well-being a “master value” in the 
36 Theclaim that nothing is of value unless it figures in this way in people’s 
well-being is  similar to John  Stuart Mill’s famous claim in  Utilitarianism that “hap- 
piness  is  not  an  abstract  idea  but  a  concrete  whole”  with  parts,  each  of  which  is 
desirable in itself, and that nothing is desired for its own sake unless it is desired as 
a part  of  happiness  (Utilitarianism and  Other Essays, ed. Alan  Ryan, pp.  308-10). 
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sense described  above:  not  all values  would  be  reducible to the 
value of well-being.37
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